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Powering innovation through tax concessions: the changing research & 
development tax incentives  
 
 
Kerrie Sadiq 
 
The changing R&D Tax Concession has been touted as the biggest reform to 
business innovation policy in over a decade.  But, is it a changing tax for 
changing times?  This paper addresses this question and further asks ‘what’s tax 
got to do with it?’.  To answer this question, the paper argues that rather than 
substantive tax reform, the proposed measures simply alter the criteria and 
means by which companies become eligible for a Federal Government subsidy 
for qualifying R&D activity.  It further argues that when considered as part of 
the broader innovation agenda, the R&D Tax Concession should be evaluated 
as a government spending program in the same way as any direct spending on 
innovation.  When this is done, the tax regime is arguably only the 
administrative policy instrument by which the subsidy is delivered.  However, it 
is proposed that this may not be best practice to distribute those funds fairly, 
efficiently, and without distortion, while at the same time maintaining adequate 
government control and accountability.  Finally, in answering the question of 
‘what’s tax got to do with it?’ the paper concludes that the answer is ‘very 
little’.   
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
On 12 May 2009, the Australian Federal Government announced changes to the Research and 
Development (R&D) Tax Concession, with those changes aimed at enhancing and 
simplifying the current regime, and designed to provide better incentives and more support 
for Australian jobs.  Exposure Draft Legislation and the accompanying Explanatory 
Materials, outlining the proposed new regime, were released on 18 December 2009.  These 
proposed changes to the R&D Tax Concession, culminating in the Draft Legislation, are a 
result of the recommendations of the 2008 Venturous Australia Report and are part of the 
Federal Government’s Innovation Policy Agenda for the 21st Century.   
 
Currently, the R&D Tax Concession, estimated to amount to approximately $1.14 billion for 
the 2009-10 income year, is the largest single Government innovation outlay.  From the 
2010-11 income year, it is proposed that an R&D Tax Credit will replace the existing R&D 
Tax Concession with a combined refundable and non-refundable tax credit system, dependent 
on annual turnover.  The current Draft Legislation provides that entities with an annual 
turnover of less than $20 million will be entitled to a refundable tax credit of 45 per cent of 
their R&D spending, equivalent to a concessional tax deduction of 150 per cent.  Entities 
with an annual turnover of more than $20 million will be entitled to a non-refundable tax 
credit of 40 per cent of their R&D spending, equivalent to a concessional tax deduction of 
133 per cent.  There will be no cap on the amount of the offset, however, there is a proposed 
tightening of the definition of eligible R&D activity. 
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This paper investigates the change from an R&D Tax Concession to an R&D Tax Credit, 
which is purported to align with the changing economic conditions, both during the global 
recession and into a global recovery.  It evaluates the R&D Tax Credit both as part of the 
Government’s innovation agenda for the 21st Century and as part of the tax expenditures 
regime within the Australian tax system.  As such, the paper initially considers the R&D Tax 
Concession as a pillar of the Government’s Innovation Agenda, and asks whether any 
changes to the current regime are likely to influence R&D decisions and encourage 
innovation.  It does so by initially examining the current R&D Tax Concession, followed by 
an examination of the features of the proposed new regime within the overall context of the 
Federal Government’s Innovation Agenda.  The second part of the paper considers the 
proposed R&D Tax Credit as part of the tax expenditures regime and evaluates it within a 
government spending paradigm, asking whether the promotion of business innovation, 
through the R&D Tax Credit, is an appropriate use of the tax system.   
 
 
A PILLAR OF INNOVATION POLICY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 
 
Australia has provided tax concessions for R&D spending for the last 25 years.  While the 
form of these concessions has been modified over these years, the purpose for which these 
concessions are provided has not changed.  Principally, the concessions are designed to 
encourage investment in R&D activities, with the aim of making Australia internationally 
competitive.  Like all OECD countries, Australia continually aims to strengthen innovation, 
increase productivity and ensure long term growth and development.  These are valid aims, 
especially in light of recent global economic uncertainty, and there are few who would argue 
that Government spending on R&D activities for these purposes should not be a priority.  As 
such, the Federal Government’s Innovation Agenda for the 21st Century, designed to make 
Australia more productive and competitive, is both a noble and justifiable use of federal 
funding.  However, R&D Tax Concessions are not the only strategy adopted to achieve these 
goals as there are many facets to the Government’s Innovation Agenda.  More specifically, 
seven National Innovation Priorities have been adopted: 
 
Priority 1: Public research funding supports high-quality research that addresses 
national challenges and opens up new opportunities. 
 
Priority 2: Australia has a strong base of skilled researchers to support the national 
research effort in both the public and private sectors. 
 
Priority 3: The innovation system fosters industries of the future, securing value from 
the commercialisation of Australian research and development. 
 
Priority 4: More effective dissemination of new technologies, processes, and ideas 
increases innovation across the economy, with a particular focus on small and 
medium-sized enterprises. 
 
Priority 5: The innovation system encourages a culture of collaboration within the 
research sector and between researchers and industry. 
 
Priority 6: Australian researchers and businesses are involved in more international 
collaborations on research and development. 
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Priority 7: The public and community sectors work with others in the innovation 
system to improve policy development and service delivery.1 
 
All of these priorities require public funding in some form and supporting R&D through 
concessions, or Government spending, has historically been only part of the overall 
innovation strategy.  This was stressed in the 2008 Venturous Australia Report which, when 
discussing R&D as part of the way forward, stated: 
 
These objectives are part of a broader set of objectives which seek to 
encourage, through the Government’s industry and technology policies, 
the development in Australia of internationally competitive, export 
oriented, innovative industries. ...  This reminds us that the Tax 
Concession needs to be considered and evaluated within the overall suite 
of innovation and technology policies.2 
 
Clearly, the Federal Government envisages an R&D Tax Concession to continue in a role of 
supporting innovation in Australia for the next decade.  However, given the estimated 
expenditure on the R&D Tax Concession is $1.14 billion for the 2009-10 income tax year, it 
is of fundamental importance that the program distributes those funds fairly, efficiently, and 
without distortion, while at the same time there is adequate government control and 
accountability.  These issues are addressed in the second part of this paper after a discussion 
of the development of the regime as part of the Government’s innovation policy. 
 
The Introduction of an R&D Tax Concession: 1986 
 
R&D Tax Concession was first introduced in Australia with the enactment of s73B of the 
ITAA36, applying from the 1985-86 income tax year.  While the R&D Tax Concession is 
currently part of the Australia income tax regime, it is administered jointly by Innovation 
Australia (AusIndustry3) and the Australian Taxation Office.  Section 73B(1AAA)4 provides 
guidance as to the purpose for which the provisions were enacted and states that the object of 
this section is to provide a tax incentive, in the form of a deduction, to encourage research 
and development activities in Australia and make eligible companies more internationally 
competitive by:  
(a)  encouraging the development by eligible companies of innovative products, processes 
and services; and  
(b)  increasing investment by eligible companies in defined research and development 
activities; and  
(c)  promoting the technological advancement of eligible companies through a focus on 
innovation and high technical risk in defined research and development activities; and  
(d)  encouraging the use by eligible companies of strategic research and development 
planning; and  
(e)  creating an environment that is conducive to increased commercialisation of new 
processes and product technologies developed by eligible companies.  
                                                            
1 Powering Ideas – An Innovation Agenda for the 21st Century (Innovation Report), 12 May 2009, 
http://www.innovation.gov.au/innovationreview/Pages/home.aspx 
2 Venturous Australia, Full Report, 102. 
3 The business program delivery division in the Federal Government Department of Innovation, Industry, 
Science and Research. 
4 This objects clause was inserted into the Act in 2001.   
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The regime introduced in 1986 provides an increased deduction of 125 percent for eligible 
R&D expenditure (150 percent for expenditure incurred prior to 20 August 1996).  Only 
companies incorporated in Australia and undertaking eligible Australian-owned R&D 
activities are entitled to claim the tax concession.  However, a prerequisite to a claim in the 
company’s annual tax return is the registration with Innovation Australia.  Applications for 
registration are lodged annually under the Industry Research and Development Act 1986 
(IR&D Act).  Where a company meets the eligibility criteria, the R&D tax concession may be 
then claimed as part of the company tax return.   
 
The basic eligibility requirement to access the R&D tax concession is that the company is 
engaged in eligible R&D activities as defined by the ITAA36.  There are two kinds of 
eligible R&D activities; core activities and supporting activities.  Core activities consist of 
systematic, investigative and experimental activities that involve innovation or high levels of 
technical risk and are carried on for the purpose of acquiring new knowledge (whether or not 
that knowledge will have a specific practical application) or creating new or improved 
materials, products, devices processes or services.5  Supporting activities are those other 
activities that are carried on for a purpose directly related to the carrying on of core 
activities.6  Qualifying expenditure generally includes salaries expenditure, other expenditure 
incurred directly in respect of R&D activities (overheads and administrative costs), 
contracted expenditure, certain assets (125 percent depreciation), feedstock expenditure, core 
technology expenditure (100 percent to a maximum of one-third of the amount of R&D 
expenditure), interest expenditure (100 percent deductible), and payments to a cooperative 
research centre.   
 
In addition to the basic eligibility requirement of eligible R&D activity expenditure, a 
company must also be able to demonstrate that there has been an annual minimum R&D 
expenditure of $20,000, the activities have been carried out by, or on behalf of the company, 
the R&D activities are to the benefit of the Australian economy and the results exploited on 
normal commercial terms, the R&D activities are carried out in Australia (subject to a 10 
percent de minimis rule), and the R&D activities contain adequate Australian content. 
 
Amendments to the Regime: 2001-2007 
 
The basic regime, introduced in 1986, has been supplemented by three further incentives 
which have subsequently expanded the 125 percent increased deduction.  The first, 
introduced in 2001, is the refundable R&D tax offset available to small companies.  
Qualifying companies may elect to take the concession as an offset rather than a deduction.  
However, these companies must have an annual group turnover of less than $5 million, have 
R&D expenditure that exceeds $20,000, and have grouped expenditure on R&D below $1 
million for years prior to 2008-09 or below $2 million for the 2009/10 income year.  This 
alternative concession is aimed at providing incentives to small innovative companies, where 
there is a tax loss.  The second additional incentive, also introduced in 2001 for income years 
after that date, is the 175 percent premium concessional deduction for additional expenditure.  
The 175 percent deduction is available for expenditure which exceeds a base level 
determined by the average R&D expenditure over the previous three year period.  The third 
additional incentive, introduced from the 2007-08 income year, provides a 175 percent 
                                                            
5 Section 73B(1) ITAA36. 
6 Section 73B(1) ITAA36. 
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international premium which is available to Australian incorporated companies belonging to 
multinational enterprise groups.   In this case, a base deduction of 100 percent is available for 
any R&D expenditure incurred on behalf of the grouped company with an additional 75 
percent deduction for expenditure in addition to the three-year average. 
 
The Impetus for Change: The Cutler Report - 2008 
 
On 22 January 2008 the Federal Minister for Innovation, Industry, Science and Research 
commissioned a Review of the National Innovation System.  The Review Panel of the 
resulting report, known as Venturous Australia – Building Strength in Innovation7 or, 
informally, the Cutler Report, released its findings and recommendations on 29 August 2008.  
Within the overall context of innovation, the Review Panel identified the need for a 
reappraisal of the current national innovation system and argued that the policies it comprises 
require renewal, refurbishment, recasting and in some cases re-imagining.8  Most specifically, 
the Report identified the current tax incentives as requiring transformation and 
rationalisation.   
 
The Review Panel primarily commented on the problems the current R&D concessional 
regime has faced since inception, as well as the ‘band-aid’ additional programs introduced to 
tackle these problems.  Two limitations to the current regime were specifically addressed: the 
inability of the basic regime to benefit firms in a tax loss position along with the very tight 
targeting of the subsequent addition of the R&D tax offset; and the reduction of the rate of 
the concession, initially from 150 percent to 125 percent and subsequently, the reduction 
caused by the lowering of the company tax rate.9  It commented that the latter causes the 
concession to provide ‘relatively low levels of assistance and not surprisingly this strongly 
constrains the extent to which it induces additional R&D.  Further, the Concession is 
accounted for ‘below the line’ and so is often invisible in company financial decision 
making.’10  The Report also commented on the ultimately unsuccessful expansion of the 
scheme in 1989 to allow syndication, that is, projects carried out by a group of companies.11  
The Cutler Report concluded that the shortcomings of the current regime and the subsequent 
attempts at a correction had resulted in fragmentation and complexity.12 
 
Following the recognition of the problems associated with the current R&D concessional 
regime, the Cutler Report made several recommendations.  It recognised that the current 
R&D concessions were introduced at a time when the prevailing model of business research 
involved in-house corporate laboratories.13  As such, the ensuing R&D Tax Concession 
recommendations contained both substantive and administrative aspects.  The substantive 
recommendations were twofold.  First, the R&D Tax Concession be changed from a tax 
deduction to a tax credit.14  Secondly, the existing R&D Tax Concession, consisting of the 
basic 125 percent deduction, the 175 percent Premium, the R&D Tax Offset and the 
International Premium, be replaced with a Tax Credit of 40 percent for large firms and a 
refundable Tax Credit of 50 percent for smaller firms with a turnover of less than $50 
                                                            
7 Venturous Australia – Building Strength in Innovation, 29 August 2008, (Venturous Australia, Full Report) 
http://www.innovation.gov.au/innovationreview/Pages/home.aspx  
8 Venturous Australia, Full Report, xii. 
9 Venturous Australia, Full Report, xiii. 
10 Venturous Australia, Full Report, xiii. 
11 This expansion of the scheme was ultimately repealed in 1996. 
12 Venturous Australia, Full Report, 102. 
13 Venturous Australia, Full Report, 101. 
14 Venturous Australia, Full Report, 107, Recommendation 8.2. 
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million.15  The Cutler report also recommended changes to the definition of eligible R&D 
activity effectively tightening eligibility. 
 
Ultimately, it was the Cutler Report, delivered over two years ago, which first proposed the 
‘transformation and rationalisation of the suite of available tax concessions.’16  Subsequently, 
the current Federal Government has adopted the thrust of the Cutler recommendations in 
relation to the R&D Tax Concessions. 
 
Powering Ideas: An Innovation Agenda for the 21st Century 
 
On 12 May 2009 the Australian Government released its innovation policy agenda to 2020.  
Senator Kim Carr, Minister for Innovation, Industry, Science and Research, in the 67 page 
document entitled Powering Ideas – An Innovation Agenda for the 21st Century17, outlined 
the reform agenda designed to make Australia more productive and more competitive.  Only 
one and a half pages were devoted to tax incentives and consistent with the Cutler Report, 
this Report also commented on the shortcomings of the current R&D Concession.  In 
particular, the Innovation Report relied on a 2007 Report18 which evaluated the extended 
R&D measures introduced in 2001, and concluded that the premium concessions were too 
complex and did not influence R&D spending decisions.19  The same Report also concluded 
that while the R&D Tax Offset does encourage small firms with tax losses to increase their 
R&D expenditure, the $5 million turnover limit excluded many small, innovative companies 
and the $1 million expenditure limit discouraged firms from exceeding that threshold.20 
 
Given its similar conclusion as to the lack of effectiveness of the current R&D concessions, 
the Innovation Report accepted the thrust of the recommendations of the Cutler report.  
However, it did not accept the 50 percent refundable tax credit for smaller firms with an 
annual turnover of less than $50 million.  Rather, the Innovation Report outlined the 
Government’s proposed R&D Tax Offset, which was also announced in the 2009 Federal 
Government Busget, to apply from 2010-1121 as a 45 percent refundable tax credit for 
Australian-owned firms turning over up to $20 million a year, and a 40 percent non-
refundable tax credit to all other firms.22 
 
The Innovation Report outlined the rationale for the introduction of a tax credit, providing 
five reasons for adopting the new regime: 
 
 it tilts support in favour of small and medium-sized businesses, which are more 
responsive to fiscal incentives; 
 it makes cash refunds available to more firms, including capital-starved start-ups in 
biotechnology and other high-tech industries;  
                                                            
15 Venturous Australia, Full Report, 107, Recommendation 8.3. 
16 Venturous Australia, Full Report, xiii. 
17 Powering Ideas – An Innovation Agenda for the 21st Century (Innovation Report), 12 May 2009, 
http://www.innovation.gov.au/innovationreview/Pages/home.aspx  
18 New Elements of the R&D Tax Concession: Evaluation Report, Canberra, June 2007, 
http://www.innovation.gov.au/Section/Innovation/Pages/RandDTaxConcessionNewElementsEvaluationReport.
aspx  
19 Innovation Report, p46. 
20 Innovation Report, p46. 
21 As an interim measure the $1 million spending threshold which applies to the current R&D Tax Credit will be 
increased to $2 million. 
22 Innovation Report, p46. 
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 it is simpler and more predictable than the present tax concession;  
 it increases certainty by uncoupling the level of R&D support from the corporate tax 
rate; and  
 it is consistent with international best practice.23  
 
In relation to the fifth point, the Innovation Report argues that because tax credits are already 
used in the United States, Japan, and many parts of Europe, ‘the new system will be familiar 
to international firms headquartered in these places, making Australia a more attractive 
destination for foreign R&Dinvestment in defence, pharmaceuticals, and a host of other 
industries.’24 
 
The Innovation Report did not provide any further details in relation to R&D tax concessions 
as part of the Government’s innovation agenda for the 21st Century as this part of the agenda 
was left to The Treasury. 
 
The New Research and Development Tax Incentive: Consultation Paper 
 
Subsequent to the Innovation Report, a Treasury Consultation Paper25, released in September 
2009, outlined in greater detail the proposed changes to the R&D Tax Concession, due to 
come into effect from 1 July 2010.26  The Consultation Paper provides that the case for 
reform is based on the contention that the new regime will be both more effective in 
delivering support for business R&D and in the more effective targeting of that support to 
produce net-benefits for the Australian community.27   
 
The detail of the new proposed R&D Tax Concession, which had not previously been 
released by the Federal Government, was contained in this document.  Consistent with the 
Innovation Report, the proposed new incentive is described as having two core components: a 
non-refundable 40 percent Standard R&D Credit and a 45 percent Refundable R&D Tax 
Credit.  It outlined the 45 percent Refundable R&D Tax Credit which will be available to 
those firms who engage in eligible R&D activity and have a grouped turnover28 of less than 
$20 million and the 40 percent Standard R&D Tax Credit, which will be available to firms 
with a grouped turnover of more than $20 million.  The Consultation Paper provided that 
both the refundable and non-refundable credits would be available to companies incorporated 
in Australia29, and, as such, foreign companies would not satisfy the eligibility criteria.  
However, this has been expanded in the Draft Legislation to include Australian permanent 
establishments of foreign companies.  The Consultation Paper also noted that the proposed 
credits of 45 percent and 40 percent are the equivalent of a tax deduction of 150 percent and 
                                                            
23 Innovation Report, p47. 
24 Innovation Report, p47. 
25 The Treasury, The New Research and Development Tax Incentive – Consultation Paper, 
http://www.treasury.gov.au/documents/1599/PDF/Consultation_paper_90916.pdf, September 2009. 
26 At the time of writing this paper, exposure draft legislation had not been released.  However, the Government 
intends to introduce legislation into Parliament in early 2010.  The new provisions will move the R&D 
concessions from the ITAA36 to the ITAA97.  Associated amendments will be made to the Industry Research 
and Development Act 1986. 
27 The New Research and Development Tax Incentive – Consultation Paper, 2. 
28 The grouping rules, similar to those under the current regime, will ensure that groups do not split the eligible 
R&D spending between companies to take advantage of the refundable credit. 
29 Other entities, such as trusts, will not be eligible.  The Refundable R&D Tax Credit will be available to 
companies with up to 50 percent ownership by exempt entities, which doubles the current allowance. 
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133 percent respectively, with the effect of the 45 percent refundable credit favouring small 
and medium sized businesses.30   
 
Significantly, the Consultation Paper provided detail of the third element to the new regime.  
Until the release of the Consultation Paper, the new regime had generally been couched in 
terms of a refundable and non-refundable tax credit with only passing reference made to the 
proposed changes to the eligibility criteria.  However, the Consultation Paper expanded the 
two substantive elements of the proposed regime to a third essential element contained within 
the proposed changes, and one which has significant fiscal implications, that of the tighter 
definition of R&D activity.  The tighter definition of R&D activity is an integral part of the 
proposed changes as it is only with this tightening that the new tax incentive is arguably 
revenue neutral.  The aim of the Federal Government is to maintain the same spending, in a 
tax expenditure context, on R&D over the first four years of operation of the new regime.31 
 
The details contained in the Consultation Paper have now been incorporated into the 
Exposure Draft Legislation, and, as such, details of the proposed regime are discussed below. 
 
Exposure Draft: Tax Laws Amendment (Research and Development) Bill 2010 
 
On 18 December 2009, the Treasury released Explanatory Materials and Draft Legislation, to 
become the Taxation Laws Amendment (Research and Development) Bill 2010.  Once passed, 
the operative provisions for the R&D Tax Concessions will be contained in Division 355 of 
the ITAA97 and the current R&D provisions in the ITAA36 will be repealed.  In addition to 
the amendments to the income tax regime, the corresponding administrative rules will be 
contained in the new Part III of the Industry Research and Development Act 1986 (IR&D 
Act).  These provisions set out the role of Innovation Australia in relation to the 
administration of the R&D regime.  Essentially, the regime will continue to operate on a self-
assessment basis with Innovation Australia continuing to register entities and assess whether 
activities are eligible for the R&D tax concession.   
 
The Explanatory Materials summarise the new law as providing ‘eligible entities with a tax 
offset for expenditure on eligible R&D activities and for the decline in value of depreciating 
assets used for eligible R&D activities.  The rate of the tax offset and whether it is 
refundable, depends primarily on the aggregated turnover of the R&D entity.’32  The core 
elements of the proposed regime along with the changes from the current regime are 
considered below. 
 
R&D Activities 
 
Apart from the two core components of the proposed regime, the most significant change will 
be the tightening of the definition of R&D activities.  Consistent with the current regime, 
activities are still defined as either core or supporting.  However, both definitions have been 
tightened, with the aim of ensuring that the concessions are directed towards ‘those activities 
                                                            
30 The Consultation Paper argues that small and medium businesses are more responsive to fiscal incentives.  
The New Research and Development Tax Incentive – Consultation Paper, 2. 
31 The New Research and Development Tax Incentive – Consultation Paper, 2. 
32 Exposure Draft Legislation, Taxation Laws Amendment (Research and Development) Bill 2010, Explanatory 
Materials, 18 December 2009, p6. 
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which are most likely to generate an additional benefit for the economic as a whole’33, that is, 
aligning with the ‘rationale for providing a general subsidy for business R&D’34.  In 
particular, core activity will need to involve considerable novelty and high levels of risk 
rather than the previous requirement of innovation (appreciable degree of novelty) or high 
levels of risk.  Supporting R&D activities will need to be undertaken for the dominant 
purpose of supporting core R&D activities compared to the current requirement that they 
need to be undertaken for a purpose directly related to conducting core activities.  Generally, 
only R&D activity conducted in Australia will qualify for the R&D tax concession.   
 
R&D Entities 
 
The category of entities eligible for the proposed R&D tax incentive will be expanded to 
include three categories of entities: corporations that are Australian residents for tax 
purposes; foreign corporations that carry on R&D activities through a permanent 
establishment; and public trading trusts with a corporate trustee.  It is stated that the 
expansion to include Australian permanent establishments of foreign entities is designed to 
provide inducement for companies to conduct R&D activity in Australia.35  However, it is 
arguable that the principle driver of this inclusion is the Non-discrimination Articles 
contained in Australia’s double tax treaties.   
 
R&D Expenditure 
 
Neither the proposed refundable or non-refundable tax offset will be subject to an 
expenditure cap.  However, the minimum expenditure threshold of $20,000 will continue to 
apply, except where activities are performed for an R&D entity by a research service 
provider.  Further strengthening the incentives provided to multinational entities is the ability 
of an entity to claim the concession for eligible R&D activities regardless of where the 
intellectual property is held.  Although, where expenditure is incurred to an associate entity, 
the tax incentive will only be available on a payment basis.  
 
R&D Offsets 
 
As previously stated, the proposed offsets consist of a 45 per cent refundable tax offset for 
R&D entities with an aggregated turnover of less than $20 million (unless they are a tax 
exempt entity or majority owned or controlled by tax exempt entities) and 40 per cent non-
refundable tax offset for all other R&D entities.  Any unused non-refundable tax offset may 
be carried forward under the tax offset carry forward rules.   
 
The remainder of this paper now turns to an evaluation of the proposed R&D Tax 
Concession, as part of the Government’s spending program. 
 
 
  
                                                            
33 Exposure Draft Legislation, Taxation Laws Amendment (Research and Development) Bill 2010, Explanatory 
Materials, 18 December 2009, p7. 
34 Exposure Draft Legislation, Taxation Laws Amendment (Research and Development) Bill 2010, Explanatory 
Materials, 18 December 2009, p11. 
35 Exposure Draft Legislation, Taxation Laws Amendment (Research and Development) Bill 2010, Explanatory 
Materials, 18 December 2009, p8. 
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EVALUATING R&D TAX INCENTIVES WITHIN A GOVERNMENT SPENDING 
PARADIGM 
 
The Explanatory Materials to the Exposure Draft Legislation state that ‘[t]he new R&D tax 
incentive is the biggest reform to business innovation support for more than a decade.  It cuts 
red tape and provides a better incentive for companies to invest in R&D.’36  It goes on to 
provide that ‘[t]he new R&D tax incentive is also an opportunity to ensure support for 
business R&D is consistent with the underlying rationale for government intervention and 
delivers value for money for taxpayers.’37   
 
So, the obvious question (maybe not so obvious) is: 
‘What’s tax got to do with it?’ 
 
For one who does not want to probe further the answer is simple, the tax regime is the vehicle 
by which the subsidy is delivered.  The case for subsidising R&D is outlined in the 
Explanatory Materials to the Exposure Draft Legislation and is also worth noting for its lack 
of substantive tax content.  It highlights the following reasons for providing a subsidy: 
 
 Innovation is recognised internationally as an important driver of productivity and 
economic growth. It encompasses a wide range of activities in the economy, including 
workforce skills, venture capital, knowledge transfer, technology uptake, management 
practices and R&D. 
 In a global economy, companies have incentives to invest in R&D to improve their 
competitiveness and ongoing profitability. Broader economic factors such as 
macroeconomic stability, competitive markets, efficient credit markets and access to 
skilled labour are all important influences on a firm’s decision to invest in R&D.  
 Knowledge produced by firms as they perform R&D often has beneficial impacts on 
other firms or the economy as a whole (often referred to as spillovers). A firm may 
choose not to undertake R&D because of technical uncertainty in cases where the 
knowledge generated would spillover to the benefit of other firms and the wider 
economy. In such situations, less R&D may occur than would be optimal for the 
economy as a whole.  
 A public subsidy that appropriately targets such spillovers can be beneficial for the 
economy as a whole and improve productivity. To this end, the new R&D tax 
incentive redirects assistance to those activities most likely to generate spillovers. It 
also tilts assistance in favour of smaller innovative firms as they are more likely to 
respond to fiscal incentives.38 
 
This leads is to the fairly obvious conclusion that the R&D concessions are primarily viewed 
as part of the Government’s spending in the innovation agenda.  However, as these 
concessions are contained within the tax regime, they may also regarded as tax expenditures.  
 
  
                                                            
36 Exposure Draft Legislation, Taxation Laws Amendment (Research and Development) Bill 2010, Explanatory 
Materials, 18 December 2009, p5. 
37 Exposure Draft Legislation, Taxation Laws Amendment (Research and Development) Bill 2010, Explanatory 
Materials, 18 December 2009, p5. 
38 Exposure Draft Legislation, Taxation Laws Amendment (Research and Development) Bill 2010, Explanatory 
Materials, 18 December 2009, p6. 
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Australia’s Tax Expenditures Regime 
 
In Australia, tax expenditures are reported in the annual tax expenditures statement, which 
commenced in 1986.  For annual reporting purposes, a tax expenditure is defined as ‘a 
concession that provides a benefit to a specified activity or class of taxpayer… Tax 
expenditures can be provided in many forms, including tax exemptions, tax deductions, tax 
offsets, concessional tax rates or deferrals of tax liability.’39  They are also described by way 
of comparison, as ‘an alternative to direct expenditures as a method of delivering government 
assistance or meeting government objectives’40.   
 
A measure of R&D expenditures is provided within these annual statements.  Consistent with 
most OECD countries, tax expenditures in the Australia are measured according to the 
revenue forgone approach.  That is, the measure is based on the difference in tax paid by 
taxpayers who receive a particular concession relative to similar taxpayers who do not 
receive that concession.  The current/prospective treatment is then compared to the 
benchmark treatment, assuming taxpayer behaviour is unchanged.41  The 2008 Tax 
Expenditures Statement provides estimates for 211 of the 324 tax expenditures identified, 
with medium to high reliability for 56 per cent of those measured.42   
 
The most recent data is provided in the 2008 Tax Expenditures Statement.  A significant 
factor affecting the reporting of trends in this Statement is the inclusion of goods and services 
tax expenditures for the first time, with this category of tax expenditures estimated to be 
measured at $12.96 billion of the total $73.7 billion for the 2007-08 income year.  These total 
measured tax expenditures for the 2007-08 income year comprise $29.23 billion 
superannuation tax expenditures and $44.47 billion of other expenditures.  Two tax 
expenditures falling in the ‘other expenditures’ category are B89: Premium tax concession for 
additional research and development expenditure and B90: Research and development tax 
concession.  For the 2007-08 year the two categories make up $310 million and $510 million 
respectively.  It is estimated that for the 2009-10 income year the two categories will account 
for $470 million and $670 million respectively, totalling $1.14 billion43 - a not insignificant 
amount of spending.  Yet, throughout the innovation review process and the subsequent 
proposals to change the current R&D Tax Concession, there is only passing mention to the 
fact that this is in actuality a Federal Government spending program.  Given this is the case, it 
would seem wise to evaluate this spending in a similar manner to direct government 
spending.   
 
Evaluating the R&D Tax Concession as a Direct Expenditure 
 
Tax expenditures are generally accepted as deviations from the normal tax base, however 
defined.  As such, they have very little to do with tax policy.  Rather, it is suggested that the 
decision to place a spending program into the tax regime ‘is solely a matter of institutional 
design.’44  Generally, an assessment of any part of the tax regime is undertaken using the 
design criteria of equity, efficiency and simplicity.  However, if it is accepted that tax 
                                                            
39 Commonwealth of Australia, Tax Expenditures Statement 2008, January 2009, p1. 
40 Commonwealth of Australia, Tax Expenditures Statement 2008, January 2009, p1. 
41 Commonwealth of Australia, Tax Expenditures Statement 2008, January 2009, p17. 
42 Commonwealth of Australia, Tax Expenditures Statement 2008, January 2009, p6. 
43 It should be noted that this is an estimate with the estimate reliability rated medium to low. 
44 Ibid. 
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expenditures are solely a matter of institutional design, and are the equivalent to direct 
spending, an alternative assessment model is that which would apply to direct expenditures.  
The author, in a previous paper45, relying on the work of Brooks46, suggested that a four-stage 
inquiry process should be adopted to evaluate both proposed and existing tax expenditures.  
As such, these steps can be applied in the current context to evaluate the R&D Tax 
Concession.  They are:  
 
1. Is the [proposed] tax expenditure serving a valid government objective and does it 
reflect a government spending priority; 
2. Assuming the [proposed] expenditure serves a valid government purpose, and using 
budgetary criteria: 
 Are the benefits distributed fairly; 
 Is the program target efficient (for example, does it reach intended 
beneficiaries); 
 Does the program avoid causing any unintended distorting effects; 
 Are the administrative and compliance costs of the program reasonable; 
 Does the government have control over the spending program and is it 
politically accountable for it; 
 Is the program [to be] appropriately implemented; 
3. What is the best government policy instrument for the [proposed] expenditure; and  
4. If the spending program is [to be] delivered through the tax system, what is the most 
appropriate design?47 
 
Each of these is addressed in turn. 
 
Question 1: A valid government objective and a government spending priority 
 
A consideration of the first section of this paper indicates that spending on research and 
development is a valid government objective and, further, is clearly a current government 
spending priority.  As such, the spending per se would seem to be justified.  However, it is 
essential that a distinction be made between need and design.  This first question addresses 
the need for such expenditure but does not result in an answer as to design.  It is in the 
remaining three questions that this substantive issue arises.   
 
Question 2: An evaluation using budgetary criteria.   
 
Tax expenditures, since the 1970s, have been considered the equivalent of direct 
expenditures.  Yet, despite this supposition, tax expenditures are not evaluated in the same 
manner as direct expenditures.  In particular, they are not subject to the same regulatory 
controls and are not part of the annual budget process.  Tax expenditures also suffer from 
transparency problems and despite tax expenditures reporting are generally poorly managed.  
The R&D Tax Concession is no exception.    However, if budgetary criteria are used issues of 
equity, efficiency, possible distortion, administrative and compliance costs and 
implementation are then considered.   
                                                            
45 Sadiq, K, Commentary: The Under-Appreciated Implications of the Tax Expenditure Concept, Australian 
Business Tax Reform in Retrospect and Prospect, Evans, C and Krever, R, Eds. 
46 Brookes, N, The Under-Appreciated Implications of the Tax Expenditure Concept, Australian Business Tax 
Reform in Retrospect and Prospect, Evans, C and Krever, R, Eds. 
47 Sadiq, K, Commentary: The Under-Appreciated Implications of the Tax Expenditure Concept, Australian 
Business Tax Reform in Retrospect and Prospect, Evans, C and Krever, R, Eds at 264. 
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First, we can ask whether the benefits will be distributed fairly.  The current and proposed 
new regime both apply thresholds for determining the level of support provided to companies 
engaged in R&D activity.  While the proposed new regime applies more generous levels to 
small and medium companies, it remains an arbitrary and absolute cut-off.  Secondly, we can 
ask whether the program target is efficient, that is, does it reach the intended beneficiaries.  
The program requires registration of the R&D activities and then the inclusion in the 
company tax return.  At this stage it is arguable that the program may be subject to both rent 
seeking and strategies to ensure that spending falls within the criteria of eligible R&D 
activity.  To this extent, the third question to be asked is whether the program avoids causing 
any unintended distorting effects.  This may clearly be the case.    
 
The fourth question we can ask using budgetary criteria, is whether the administrative and 
compliance costs of the program are reasonable.  Arguably, there is a double handling of the 
program as the initial step for an entity to undertake is registration approval from Innovation 
Australia.  Only then can an eligible entity claim the R&D Tax Concession in their company 
tax return.  Essentially, this means that two government bodies must deal with the one 
transaction.  Finally, we can ask whether the program is to be appropriately implemented.  
Arguably, in this context, there is very little difference between the existing R&D Tax 
Concession, which has essentially failed in increasing R&D activity, and the proposed new 
regime. 
 
Question 3: What is the best Government policy instrument for the program 
 
In the 2008 Venturous Australia Report, it was stated that the ‘R&D Tax Concession is an 
iconic program in Australia.  It is also the largest single government innovation outlay’.48  
Yet, the same report went on the state: 
 
The inherent characteristics of a statutory tax instrument create challenges with 
respect to the availability of data and the transparency of the operation of the 
scheme. The evidence base around a scheme which has operated for nearly 25 
years is astonishingly poor. This paucity of data is largely caused by the legal 
and probity barriers to open disclosure of taxation data and the lack of progress 
in producing longitudinal data around matched data sets. A further problem in 
the Working Group’s assessment was the inherent difficulty of accurately 
forecasting the effects of changes to a tax instrument. This difficulty has been 
acknowledged previously in Senate hearings and introduces the need for some 
caution in framing recommendations.49 
 
In the overall context of an innovation agenda, it further stated: 
 
In summary, the case is strong for public intervention to provide support for the 
development of innovative capacity and to aid the diffusion of innovations.  
Typically, markets either fail, or simply don’t exist, when there is a high level 
of uncertainty about the future, as there often is in the case of innovations.  In 
such circumstances, government can play a pivotal role in facilitating 
innovation and providing the basis for strong productivity growth and increases 
                                                            
48 Venturous Australia, Full Report, 101. 
49 Venturous Australia, Full Report, 102. 
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in the standard of living in the future.  Of course, the presence of uncertainty 
also means that there are several risks for governments in supporting 
innovation: money can be wasted unnecessarily and we can find examples of 
this in the past, both in Australia and overseas.  This is why it is so important to 
adhere to a consistent set of design principles in development an innovation 
policy.  At the present time, Australia has a large number of policies to 
stimulate innovation that have been developed in a fragmentary and 
inconsistent way.  This must change if we are to have a set of policy 
instruments that is both highly effective and economical.50 
 
The Objects section of the proposed legislation also makes it clear that the fundamental 
question of taxation is not an issue in this case.  It states: 
355-5 Object  
(1)  The object of this Division is to encourage industry to conduct *R&D activities 
that might otherwise not be conducted because of technical uncertainty, in cases 
where the knowledge gained is likely to spillover to the benefit of the wider 
Australian economy.  
(2)  This object is achieved by providing a tax incentive for industry to conduct 
experimental activities that:  
(a)  are systematic and investigative; and  
(b)  involve considerable novelty and *high levels of technical risk; and  
(c)  are conducted for the purpose of generating new knowledge or information 
in a general or applied form.  
(3)  The tax incentive takes the form of a *tax offset for these core experimental 
activities. The tax offset is also available for directly related activities that are 
conducted for the dominant purpose of supporting such core experimental 
activities (rather than for a broader commercial or other purpose).  
 
Continuing to adopt a program which requires the administration of government spending on 
R&D to be administered through the tax regime is flawed.  Yet, surprisingly, and despite the 
acknowledgement of these issues in the Venturous Australia Report, there was no further 
discussion as to an alternative. 
 
Question 4: If the program is to be delivered through the tax system, what is the most 
appropriate design. 
 
When the draft legislation was released on 18 December 2009, it was touted as the ‘biggest 
reform to business innovation policy in over a decade’51.  It went on to state that the ‘draft 
legislation follows through on the Government’s commitment to deliver a more generous, 
more predictable, and less complex tax incentive by replacing the outdated and complicated 
R&D Tax Concession’52.  Further outlining the proposed new regime, the press release 
stated: 
 
                                                            
50 Venturous Australia, Full Report, 44. 
51 Federal Government, The Department of the Treasury, Press Release, 18 December 2009. 
52 Federal Government, The Department of the Treasury, Press Release, 18 December 2009. 
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This important microeconomic reform is part of the Government's broad 
productivity agenda. It will cut red tape and provide better incentives to help 
boost the competitiveness of the Australian economy. 
 
The R&D Tax Credit is also a central element of the Rudd Government's long-
term agenda to lift Australia's innovation capacity and performance, Powering 
Ideas. 
 
It is about boosting investment in research and development, supporting jobs 
and strengthening Australian companies as they continue to seize new 
opportunities during the economic recovery.  
 
Given the above Federal Government comments relating to the new scheme, it is difficult to 
reach a scenario where question four needs to be answered.   
 
 
AN ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL 
 
After considering the current and proposed new R&D Tax Incentive, it becomes obvious that 
tax has very little to do with this part of the Federal Government’s innovation agenda and that 
the tax regime is merely a mechanism by which to deliver over one billion dollars of public 
money to entities engaged in R&D activities.  This does not result in the conclusion that this 
money should not be spent on suitable R&D activities, but rather, that these subsidies should 
be considered as part of the Federal Government’s broader spending program.  If the 
subsidies are to be thought of as part of a broader spending regime then it becomes a question 
of the best way to deliver these subsidies. 
 
A simple alternative to a tax concession regime is a direct matching grants scheme.  The 
proposed new R&D Tax Concession will provide small and medium entities with a 
refundable tax credit of 45 percent.  This means that for every 55 cents an eligible entity 
spends, the Government provides 45 cents.  With large entities the amounts will be 60 cents 
spent, matched with 40 cents.  There is an administrative body, Innovation Australia, already 
in place and well qualified to determine eligible R&D activities (because it does so already), 
there is a mathematical formula in place to determine the matching ratio (as above), and the 
eligible entities are registered with the existing administrative body so there is no need for 
any further administrative body to be involved.  This would eliminate the need for any 
legislation to be part of the tax regime thereby reducing the governing legislation to one 
rather than two Acts, it would eliminate the need for the Australian Taxation Office to be 
involved, thereby reducing the administrative bodies from two to one and would reduce 
compliance costs incurred by the relevant entities by having to deal with one administrative 
body and one set of forms, rather than two.   
 
On the face of it, the argument for a direct matching grant scheme seems compelling, so why 
is it not raised as an alternative; arguably, because there is less public accountability and a 
better story to tell with a tax concession than a direct spending program.  Telling the general 
public that companies who may not ever pay tax, because they are investing in R&D 
activities which may never be successful, will receive a share of $1.14 billion a year is not 
nearly as acceptable as telling the public that companies who invest in R&D activities to 
power innovation in Australia will be granted tax concessions for money they have spent.   
 
